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Abstract
Email is an increasingly important and ubiquitous means
of communication, both facilitating contact between pri-
vate individuals and enabling rises in the productivity of
organizations. However the relentless rise of automatic
unauthorized emails, a.k.a. spam is eroding away much
of the attractiveness of email communication. Most of
the attention dedicated to date to spam detection has fo-
cused on the content of the emails or on the addresses or
domains associated with spam senders. Although meth-
ods based on these - easily changeable - identifiers work
reasonably well they miss on the fundamental nature
of spam as an opportunistic relationship, very different
from the normal mutual relations between senders and
recipients of legitimate email. Here we present a com-
prehensive graph theoretical analysis of email traffic that
captures these properties quantitatively. We identify sev-
eral simple metrics that serve both to distinguish between
spam and legitimate email and to provide a statistical ba-
sis for models of spam traffic.
1 Introduction
Spam is quickly becoming the leading threat to the via-
bility of email as a means of communication and a lead-
ing source of fraud and other criminal activity world-
wide. Much is known about spam traffic. According
to the Spamhaus project [16] the vast majority of spam
emails presently originate in the USA and China, hosted
by well known ISPs and generated by identified individ-
uals. Nevertheless an increased effort in criminal inves-
tigation and waves of high profile legislation have not
yet succeeded at reducing the relentless increase in spam
traffic [10], which now accounts for about 83% of all in-
coming emails, up from 24% in January 2003 [12].
It is often said that the problem of spam email is that
it is an extremely asymmetric threat. While it is techni-
cally easy and very cheap to send a spam email it requires
sophisticated organization and much higher costs at the
receiving end to sort out legitimate emails from junk.
This asymmetry is of course not directly manifest in
the sender’s email address, on the domain he/she uses,
nor certainly on the simplest characteristics of the mes-
sage (e.g. its size). It is rather a property of structural
relationships - spammers tend to be senders to a socially
unrelated set of receivers - while legitimate email tends,
instead, to reflect the variety of mutual personal, profes-
sional, institutional ties among people. Thus by identi-
fying the comparative structural and dynamical nature of
email traffic, we expect to find good discriminators be-
tween normal email and spam traffic. The goal of this
work is to present the modeling of email - legitimate and
spam - traffic as networks, in order to identify graph the-
oretical metrics that can be used to differentiate between
the two. We are also interested in providing a unified
view of several metrics characterizing the relationships
between senders/recipients and of their evolution for le-
gitimate and spam traffics in order to formulate, in the
future, a predictive model of spam dissemination.
Our study goes beyond several recent analyses [4, 7]
on the graphical nature of spam traffic. We deal with
a different database, involving a much larger number of
users and messages, and analyze a wider set of metrics,
both static and dynamic. We will show that there is no
single graphical metric that unequivocally distinguishes
between legitimate and spam email. There are, however,
several graph theoretical measures that can be combined
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into a probabilistic spam detection framework. These are
then identified as candidates for the construction of a fu-
ture spam filtering algorithm.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
In section 2 we introduce the modeling of email traffic in
terms of two graph classes and present the types of met-
rics to be studied. Section 3 gives several global prop-
erties of our workload. We evaluate the several metrics,
for each of the two graph classes, in Section 4. In Sec-
tion 5 we present related work. Finally, we present our
conclusions in section 6 and discuss open questions left
for future work.
2 Graph-Based Modeling of E-mail
Workloads
In order to characterize spam email traffic versus non-
spam we define two types of graphs: a user graph and a
domain graph. The vertices of the user graph are email
senders and recipients present in our log. An email sent
by A to receiver B results in a link between A and B. The
domain graph has as vertices the domains of the external
senders to the local domain being analyzed, and users if
inside the local domain. Its construction is similar to the
user graph but sets of users external to the local domain
who share an external domain are aggregated together
into a single node. Note also that the domain graph is a
simpler bipartite graph and not all characteristics studied
will be present in it.
The edges of both graphs can take one of four
forms: directed or undirected; binary1 (or unweighted)
or weighted (e.g. by the number of emails exchanged or
by the total size of the emails exchanged in bytes). These
options cover most of the possibilities for direct graph-
ical construction out of the email logs at our disposal
(described in Section 3).
The user graph is in principle the most useful in identi-
fying the individual nature of users as spam or non-spam
senders. In some cases these characteristics extend to
the whole external domain (particularly if the spammer
changes his name2 more often than its domain) and the
domain graph produces a useful aggregation of the user
data. We believe that user graphs will be more effective
in identifying senders of non-spam since spam senders
tend to change their full email address very frequently.
The user or domain graphs can be constructed exclu-
sively out of spam traffic, non-spam traffic, or the ag-
gregate set of all emails. Some of the graph theoreti-
cal properties studied below will be analyzed in terms of
1If any message was sent from A to B, over the observation time a
link is established.
2The first part of the address, located before the @.
the graphs formed when considering the different traf-
fics separatelly while others will be evaluated on selected
nodes from the aggregated traffic. The selected nodes
represent senders in the aggregated graph and can be di-
vided in two classes - spam and non-spam - based on the
type of emails they send. These classes do not form dis-
joint sets, see Table 2. Since we are analyzing nodes in
terms of the email types they send, we will not present
an analysis of the edges (traffic) comming in. In other
words we will not attempt to identify spammers from
the set of emails that are sent to them, simply because
the statistical properties of such messages are clearly less
significant as those of the messages they send out.
Given these two graph constructions we will analyze
two types of properties: (i) structural and (ii) dynami-
cal. The former capture the structure of social relation-
ships between users exchanging emails, while the latter
relate to how graphical properties evolve over time. As
we shall show below there are distinct independent sig-
natures of spam traffic in both structural and dynamical
properties. As a consequence they should be taken to-
gether to generate a better detection procedure.
3 E-mail Workloads
Measure Non-Spam Spam Aggregate
# e-mails 336,580 278,522 615,102
Size of e-mails 11.00 GB 1.70 GB 12.71 GB
# sender users 94,985 170,664 263,144
# sender domains 20,414 48,087 59,971
# recipients 26,450 12,867 35,471
Table 1: Workload summary
The construction of the graphs introduced in Section 2
is subject to several practical constraints. Our knowledge
of email traffic comes from Postfix logs of the central
SMTP incoming/outgoing servers of an academic de-
partment from a large University in Brazil. Incoming
emails only contain the recipients internal to the depart-
ment’s domain. Outgoing emails contain the full list of
recipients. Moreover our data set does not contain infor-
mation about emails exchanged between users external
to the domain.
The logs were collected between 11/18/2004 and
12/31/2004 and contain the following data for each
email: (i) received time and date; (ii) a reject flag, in-
dicating whether connection was rejected during e-mail
acceptance (iii) Size of email3; (iv) sender address; (v)
list of recipients and (vi) a spam flag, indicating if it was
classified as spam or not by Spam-Assassin [15]. The
logs were sanitized and anonymized to protect the users’
3Only for the accepted emails.
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privacy. Statistical characteristics of the workload are in
agreement with previous email traffic analyses [9, 6, 17].
Table 1 summarizes the data set.
Spam-Assassin [15] is a popular spam filtering soft-
ware that detects spam emails based on a changing set
of user-defined rules. These rules assign scores to each
received e-mail based on the presence in the subject or
in the e-mail body of one or more pre-categorized key-
words. Spam-Assassin also uses other rules based on
email size and encoding. Highly ranked emails, accord-
ing to these criteria, are flagged as spam.
4 Spam Networks vs. Legitimate
Email Networks
Type External Internal
Spam 169931 (277535) 733 (987)
Non-Spam 93666 (186607) 1319 (186607)
Spam & 2366 (-) 139 (-)Non-Spam
Total 263231 (462142) 1913 (152960)
Table 2: Number of unique email addresses by origin (in-
ternal or external to the domain) and classified as spam,
non-spam or both. Numbers in parentheses indicate the
total number of emails sent by each class.
Although spam emails originate principally from users
outside the local domain spam senders use several tech-
niques to falsify or steal local addresses (e.g. crawl-
ing the web for email addresses available at web pages,
network sniffing, name dictionaries). As a result spam
email does originate from the local domain both from
real users and from forged ones. This mixing between
regular email users and spam senders can lead to more
complex email networks than might have been naively
expected and poses a challenging problem for detection.
Table 2 summarizes the number of addresses and
emails by node classes and by internal or external ori-
gin. Node classes are as defined in Section 2 plus a third
category -Spam & Non-Spam - which is the intersection
of the former two. The size of this overlap shows the
impact of email address spoofing.
Most emails originate outside the domain. In our log
most outside users are spam senders and account for the
majority of the emails. Because it is very easy for a
spammer to forge an address spam senders use many
addresses simultaneously and/or frequently switch be-
tween them. This strategy is visible in our database as
non-spam internal users send many more emails per user
than spam internal users. We expect that this is a general
feature of spam versus non-spam traffic.
The number of spam senders that are internal is very
small. The fraction of these that send exclusively spam
is 81%. These addresses correspond presumably to inter-
nal emails that have been forged and do not actually ex-
ist4. The remaining addresses send both spam and non-
spam and are probably genuine users whose addresses
have been spoofed.
4.1 Structural analysis of spam vs. non
spam email graphs
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Figure 1: Distribution of the node degrees for sender
classes in the aggregated graphs.
One of the most common structural measures ana-
lyzed in complex networks is the distribution of the num-
ber of the incoming and outgoing node connections, or
degree [14, 13, 2]. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the
out-degrees of the different sender classes for the user
and domain graphs.
The out degree distributions approximately follow a
power law (C/xα). By using a simple statistical linear
regression we estimated the exponent α that best mod-
els the data. For the user graph we obtained α = 1.497
(withR2 = 0.965.) for spam senders and α = 1.359 (R2 =
0.981) for non-spam senders. We conclude that the spam
sender’s out degree distribution is slightly more skewed.
4This suggests that a simple effective way to filter out spam origi-
nating from internal domain addresses is to verify that they correspond
to an existing user.
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We conjecture that this is because spammers have a lim-
ited knowledge of the set of users in each specific do-
main. Since in our analysis we only observe a fraction
of the spammers’ lists (the one composed by the mes-
sages sent to the domain studied) there are no spammers
with recipients’ lists as large as those found for non-spam
senders.
Degrees from 1 to near 20 are much more probable
for spam senders than for non spammmers, while very
large degrees are more likely in non-spam. There is no
difference between the two sender classes in the body of
the distribution, for degrees from about 20 to 400. The
mean out-degrees, are 3.56 and 1.63 for non-spam and
spam, respectively (see Table 2).
In the domain graph the out-degree distribution shows
a much higher probability for nodes with low out-degree
in spam traffic than in non-spam.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Communication Reciprocity
In order to evaluate discrepancies between in and out
sets of addresses for a given node we create a simple
metric called Communication Reciprocity (CR) of x as:
CR(x) =
|OS(x) ∩ IS(x)|
|OS(x)|
, (1)
where OS(x) is the set of nodes that receive a message
from node x and IS(x) is the set of addresses that send
messages to x. With our choice of normalization this
metric measures the probability of a node receiving a re-
sponse from each one of his addressees.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the Communication
Reciprocity. This metric is able to effectively differen-
tiate users associated with spam from non-spam. The
grouping of users in the domain graph makes this dif-
ferentiation more difficult. However, even in the domain
graph the difference is very clear.
The analysis of the communication reciprocity sug-
gests that a strong signature of spam is its structural im-
balance between the set of senders and receivers associ-
ated with a spam sender. However whenever there is an
imbalance, how many of the unmatched addresses corre-
spond to spam senders?
To address this question, let the asymmetry set for a
node be the difference of its in and out sets. Figure 3
shows the number of spam addresses in the asymmetry
set versus the size of the asymmetry set itself. The re-
sulting relation is very well fit by a straight line at 45o,
showing a strong correlation between the two numbers.
The statistical correlation (slope) is ρ = 0.979 for user
graph and ρ = 0.998 for the domain graph. So, almost
all senders in the asymmetry sets are spammers indiffer-
ently of the graph analyzed. The non spam data is not
very well modeled by a 45o straight line. These corre-
spond to the non spam senders that were not answered
(or to whom we could not see an answer in our log). The
correlation is ρ = 0.8723 and ρ = 0.9932 for the user
and domain graphs respectively. As expected from the
result of the spam data the non spam data has a higher
correlation for the domain graph.
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Figure 3: Number of spams/hams in the asymmetry set
vs. the number of nodes in the asymmetry set
This result can be made sharper if we analyze the cor-
relation between the number of spammers in the incom-
ing set of a node and spammers in its asymmetry set.
We find ρ = 0.999 and ρ = 0.994 for the user and
domain graphs, respectively. There is a slightly worse
correlation in the domain graph. We conjecture this is
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due to the external reliable domains used by spammers
(e.g. through spoofing and forging techniques). These
may not be counted in the asymmetry set since they are
replied through their legitime emails but are part of the
incoming set as spammers.
These results show that spam messages are almost
never replied to, except in cases of spoofed or forged do-
mains or users’ ids and rarely, we assume, intentionally.
Asymmetry sets can in principle be used as a compo-
nent in a probabilistic spam detection mechanism. The
arrival of an email from a sender that has already been
contacted by an internal recipient is an indication that it
has high probability of being a non spam email.
Another common characteristic of social networks is a
high average clustering coefficient (CC) [8]. The CC of a
node n, denoted Cn, is defined as the probability of any
two of its neighbors being neighbors themselves. This
metric is associated to the number of triangles that con-
tain a node n. For an undirected graph, the maximum
number of triangles connecting the Nn neighbors of n
is Nn × (Nn − 1)/2. Thus, the CC measures the ratio
between actual triangles and their maximal value. Dur-
ing clustering coefficient analysis we only consider the
nodes with Nn > 1, since this is a necessary condition
for the CC to be nonzero.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the clustering coefficient for the
different classes in the aggregated user graph.
Figure 4 shows the distribution for the CC of nodes in
the aggregated graphs. The clustering coefficient mea-
sures cohesion of communication, not only between two
users but among friends of friends. This is a pervasive
characteristic of social relations that is absent from spam
sender receiver connections. As a result regular email
users have higher CC than spam senders. In terms of the
average value, regular email also has a higher value (0.16
against 0.08).
Some recent studies [4] have studied graphical metrics
of the strongly connected components (SCC) of email
graphs. A SCC is a subset of the nodes of a graph, such
that one node can be reached from any other node in
the set following edges between them. A complemen-
tary measure to the CC and SCC is the average path
length between two nodes. The CC and average path
length properties are generally related to the so-called
small world networks, which display high CC (higher
than a random graph with the same connectivity) and
short path length, usually comparable to logN , where
N is the number of nodes in the graph.
In our experiments both the SCC and the average path
length have not been able to convincingly differentiate
spam from legitimate traffic. All of the graphs studied
are small world networks to some extent. Also all of the
graphs have giant connected components. Other studies
have used the clustering coefficient of SCCs to identify
spam in networks constructed from the correspondence
of a single user [4]. However for data from servers that
aggregate the communication between different senders
and receivers we find that these metrics do not suffice to
perform a clear identification of spam.
Another interesting structural characteristic of graphs
is the probability of visiting a node during a random walk
through the graphs [5]. At each step of the random walk
we need to select the next node to be visited. This can
be done in two ways. The next node can be randomly
selected from the out set of the current node or we can
perform a jump. For a jump, one of the nodes of the
graph is selected randomly as the next node. Note that,
this measure is related to node betweenness5 since higher
node betweenness tends to generate a higher probability
of visitation. Nevertheless this probability is much easier
to compute than node betweenness for large graphs. The
probability P (x) of finding a node x in a random walk is
computed iteratively as follows:
P (x) =
d
N
+ (1 − d) ∗
∑
z ∈ IS(x)
P (z)
|OS(z)|
, (2)
where d is the probability of performing a jump during
a random walk, N is the number of nodes in the graph.
The parameter d is a dumping factor that can be varied.
A value usually used in the literature is 0.15 [5], that is
also the value we use in our measurements.
The results are shown in Figure 5. The difference be-
tween spam and non-spam behavior is less noticeable in
the domain graph than in the user graph. Spam nodes
show generally lower probabilities of being visited, as
might have been expected because of the asymmetry of
their communication. Visiting probabilities for spam
nodes in the user graph are localized to the initial and
final parts of the distribution and are less pronounced in
the middle range.
The node visitation probability distributions can be
modeled by a power law. We estimate the corresponding
5The number of shortest paths that pass throught a node.
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exponent at α = 0.694, 1.097 and 0.975 for the non-
spam component of the user graph, and for the non-spam
and spam components in the domain graph, respectively.
The R2 associated with the fits varies between 0.959 and
0.998. The R2 for the spam curve of the user graph is
0.853, showing that it is not well modeled by a power
law, as visual inspection suggests.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the probability of finding a node
during a random walk.
4.2 Dynamical analysis
Beyond the structural characteristics of the graphs of
spam and non-spam email other metrics related to the dy-
namics of communication and graph evolution may help
model spam traffic.
A large amount of effort has been devoted recently to
creating realistic growth models for complex networks.
One of the key characteristics of such models is the evo-
lution of the number of nodes and edges, as well as the
probabilistic connection rules for the new nodes to those
already in the graph. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the
graph in terms of number of nodes and edges. We plot
these quantities against percentage of messages evalu-
ated for each graph, to avoid the influence of the rate of
message arrival, which varies with time depending on the
type of the traffic being considered (e.g. the bell shaped
behavior for the non spam traffic against the almost con-
stant rate for spam traffic [9, 3, 6]).
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Figure 6: Graph evolution by percentage of messages.
The growth of the aggregated graph (a composition
of the spam and the non-spam graphs) results from the
growth in both the spam and non-spam components. The
spam subgraph is a much more rapidly growing struc-
ture.Over the time of the log we find no saturation ef-
fect in these numbers. Instead the number of addresses
and edges grows almost linearly with the number of
emails. An eventual saturation in the non-spam compo-
nent might be expected for longer times.
Another important dynamical graph characteristic is
how the weights of edges evolve, i.e. how the flow
of information between nodes varies over time. An
interesting metric that can be used to measure this is
the stack distance [1] of connected pairs in terms of
the emails they exchange over time. The stack dis-
tance measures the number of distinct references be-
tween two consecutive instances of the same object in
a stream. We take the total email log as the stream and
each pair sender/receiver as the object. Ordering of the
sender/receiver is disregarded. Figure 7 shows the pairs’
stack distance distributions. We see that temporal local-
ity is much stronger in non-spam traffic. This means in
practice that legitimate users exchange emails over small
concentrations of time.
We were also interested in studying how do the nodes
communicate with their peers in terms of the number of
messages. Because of the impersonal nature of spam we
expect that spam senders communicate in a more struc-
tured way with their recipients. Not only will legitimate
senders show more variation in the number of messages
they send to each person in their out sets, they will also
show variability of the messages themselves in terms of
their sizes. In order to quantify these effects we evalu-
ated the normalized entropy of the in and out flows for
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Figure 7: Distribution of stack distances for the pairs in
the different traffics.
each node, defined as
H(x) =
∑
y∈OS(x)−p(y) ∗ log(p(y))
log(|S(x)|)
, (3)
where p(y) is the probability of y receiving a message
from x and and |S(x)| is the number of unique elements
in the set being considered.
Figure 8 shows the normalized entropy for the out flow
of the nodes in the different sender classes for the ag-
gregated graphs. As expected, spammers communicate
with their recipients with much less variability (higher
entropy). A similar analysis was conducted considering
the bytes that each node sends with similar results.
5 Related Work
Several studies have recently analyzed the statistical
properties of email workloads [6, 11, 9, 3, 17]. These
studies consider the messages as a flow and study met-
rics such as inter-arrival times, e-mail sizes, and number
of recipients per e-mail. Although spam and legitimate
email show differences in terms of these metrics little has
been done about using them to filter out spam. The work
of the present manuscript takes a different tack by cre-
ating a graph theoretical higher level representation of
email traffic and attempting to differentiate spam from
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Figure 8: Distribution of entropy of the number of mes-
sages in the flow of e-mails for the aggregated graph.
legitimate email in this abstraction. We believe that this
approach, based on graph theoretical metrics, proves to
be much better suited to the filtering problem.
Other recent papers have focused on models of email
traffic as graphs [4, 7]. For example in Ref. [4] a graph
is created representing the email traffic captured by the
mailbox of an individual user. The subsequent structural
analysis is based on the fact that such a network pos-
sesses several disconnected components. The clustering
coefficient of each of these components is then used to
characterize messages as spam or non-spam. Their re-
sults show that 53% of the messages were classified us-
ing the proposed approach and they obtained 100% of
accuracy in this subset. Our graphs are based on a dif-
ferent type of dataset, i.e. the logs of SMTP servers,
and as such do not take the perspective of the individual
user. As a result for our data set the approach proposed
in [4] can not be used successfully since there is a giant
SCC in all of the graphs shown. In [7] the authors used
the approach of detecting machines that behave as spam
senders by analyzing a border flow graph of sender and
recipient machines. Moreover, they analyzed the evolv-
ing graph structures over a period of time, based on a
single metric using the HITS algorithm. Our workload
differs from theirs since we do not have access to the
underlying overlay network formed by email relays.
7
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that legitimate and spam
email graphs differ in two fundamental classes of char-
acteristics: structural, which capture the graphs’ archi-
tecture, and dynamical, concerning node communication
and graph evolution.
Structurally we showed that spam and non spam sub-
graphs are characterized by different distributions of the
clustering coefficient of their nodes. Legitimate email
users display on average higher clustering coefficients
than spam senders. Node visitation probability is a mea-
sure of the centrality of a node relative to other nodes
in the graph. Legitimate email nodes have higher visita-
tion probability than spam nodes. We also defined a new
metric called communication reciprocity. It measures the
probability that a node receives a response from any of
its addressees. There is a strong difference in the prob-
ability distributions of the communication reciprocity in
the legitimate and spam graphs; legitimate nodes have a
much higher probability of being responded to. Another
metric introduced in this paper is the email asymmetry
set, which represents the difference between the sets of
in and out edges of a node. We showed that there is a
strong correlation between the size of asymmetry sets
and the number of spammers in the set. Dynamically
the spam graph grows much faster than the legitimate
email graph. The legitimate email graph grows more
slowly both in the number of nodes and edges, manifest-
ing the higher stability of relations in a social group. Two
other dynamical metrics, entropy and stack distance, are
used to reveal the temporal characteristics of communi-
cation among nodes. Spam nodes display a much higher
entropy than legitimate email users, and a much longer
stack distance.
We have shown that differences in both classes of
graph characteristics can be explained by the same hy-
pothesis, namely that legitimate email graphs reflect real
social networks, while spam graphs are technological
networks, devoid of a sense of community. Although no
single metric can unequivocally differentiate legitimate
emails from spam, the combination of several graphical
measures paint a clear picture of the processes whereby
legitimate and spam email are created. For this reason
they can be used to augment the effectiveness of mecha-
nisms to detect illegitimate emails.
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